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First, a disclaimer: I am not speaking here today on behalf of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), with which I have served as
Deputy Director General for almost six weeks, nor for the WTO`s
members. My point of view has been formed over nearly a half
century of involvement as a student and at times a participant in the
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formulation of international trade policy.

SOME RELEVANT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE POLICY
Since the mid-1940s most of world commerce has been conducted
within a Pax Americana. The United States was the prime mover in
the creation of the current world economic order. The World Order
reflected an American consensus.1 It is a system of global
governance enunciated by Cordell Hull in the 1930s, envisaged by
Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at Placentia Bay
Newfoundland in 1942, and enabled by the post war institutional
arrangements for the economic world order, notably the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)(and since 1995, its successor, the
World Trade Organization).
The United States did not act out of pure altruism—no country
does. There was nevertheless a measure of altruism—more than the
U.S. is often given credit for. Churchill called America’s LendLease Program that underwrote the survival of its allies in Europe
during the Second World War “the most unsordid act in history.”
This is a judgment that could be made of the creation of the postwar
trading system as well: in this case there was reciprocity, but it was
not full reciprocity in terms of a quid pro quo received by the United
States. The United States did not choose to create a system of
imperial preferences, like that which colonial powers had in the prewar period, although it could have done so. What the United States
did was foster most-favored-nation treatment. This expression of
enlightened self-interest was created in reaction to and flight from
the severe, self-absorbed and self-destructive protectionist policies of
the 1930s. There was to be benefit for all. The rules-based liberal
trading system was and is extraordinary, and has been a central factor
in lifting hundreds of millions of the earth’s inhabitants above
subsistence levels. It has been fundamentally beneficial for the
American people as well.
My use of the term “Pax” in the phrase Pax Americana is not
1. The term is used by Henry Kissinger in his 2014 book World Order.
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meant to imply that trade has been untroubled in all respects, or that
America was always consistent. However, the system was grounded
in the principle that world markets should generally be open to the
extent possible for all. A code of rules was drafted under American
leadership that strove to provide greater opportunities for the trade of
every participant, combined with rules and measures attempting to
provide fairness. While trade disputes could become heated, high
tariff walls, import quotas and competitive currency depreciations no
longer characterized world trade. The system survived a number of
tests. For example, when the European common market was formed,
new discrimination denied access for American poultry. The
permitted reaction was increased U.S. tariffs on imports of European
brandy, dextrine, potato starch, and automobile trucks. The conflict,
although called the “Chicken War,” was contained and is only a
footnote in trade history books now. In short, the system worked.

MOVING TOWARD THE PRESENT: THE IMPACT
OF THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION
It is easy to be critical of aspects of America’s stewardship of the
world trading system, but to focus now on any past American
shortfalls from its ideals is to miss the central challenge to the world
economy here and now—the absence of American leadership in the
world trading system. Atlas, tired of his burden, shrugged. The
country that was indispensable to the creation of the international
trading system has opted out of its leadership role, and the date and
nature of its return to anything like its former position is completely
uncertain.
The change in American policy was not the result of long-term
planning. It was the almost incidental product of direct, as opposed
to representative, democracy. Henry Kissinger in his magnificent
book, World Order, notes that “internal changes within societies are
able to shake the international equilibrium more profoundly than
aggression from abroad.” The idea is worth emphasizing. Dr.
Kissinger was referring to the French Revolution and events in the
20th century—no doubt in Russia in 1917 and in Germany in 1933.
However, he was prescient in his diagnosis, as within two years of
his book appearing in 2014, the Brexit vote occurred and Donald
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Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States.
As a result of this last seismic event, where we find ourselves at
present is that the United States, which was the prime guarantor of an
open multilateral trading system, has stepped back, leaving a
structure in place that was created with U.S. leadership, which now is
without a clear leader.
Positive outcomes from trade negotiations have not been easily
obtained since the WTO was founded in 1995. There are three
recent substantial positive examples, however. These are: the
decision at the 2015 WTO Ministerial in Nairobi to forswear use of
agricultural export subsidies, the negotiation and adoption of the
Trade Facilitation Agreement, and the expansion of the Information
Technology Agreement. These were far from minor achievements.
The Trade Facilitation Agreement alone is considered to be the
equivalent of elimination of over a 14% average tariff on world
trade. That is nearly double the current average actual tariffs in
place. And the Information Technology Agreement provides for a
tariff-free environment for over $1.3 trillion in per year of global
trade.
These are solid successes, but the road ahead looks more difficult.
There are areas of agreement that potentially could be harvested next
month in Buenos Aires—with respect to agriculture, an agreement on
public stockholding, on maximum levels of domestic support, on
transparency of export restrictions and improved disciplines on
certain sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations; on services, agreeing
that domestic regulations will not impair benefits already committed;
for the environment, an agreement to curb fisheries subsidies; as well
as an agreement on a work program going forward including
electronic commerce and ways to create benefits for small and
medium enterprises. But even with U.S. leadership, nothing on this
list would have simply fallen into place. Each requires extraordinary
effort. Without U.S. active engagement, the chances of success are
lower.

WHAT NOW?
The key challenge facing the world trading system now is: “If the
era of American trusteeship of international trade is potentially
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over—what can take its place?” Perform a thought experiment in
another sphere, the geopolitical. What if the United States
announced that its troops on the Korean Peninsula, in Japan and in
Germany, would be neutral, or in a more extreme case, withdrawn?
What would the potential be for changes in those regions, what
changes in the world order? Of course, no analogy is perfect, but
this one is nevertheless instructive at least in considering that the
political world would be unlikely to remain the same were these
events to take place. In the world of international commerce, a
United States that has become inactive must of necessity cause some
differences in results with respect to outcomes in the realm of
international commerce. The indispensable country has, at least at
present, absented itself from its customary role.
Given the fact that we should not expect the Trump
Administration to suddenly and fully embrace multilateralism,
something else has to change, and that of necessity is the behavior of
others. There is little outward evidence that there has yet been the
necessary adjustment to the new reality on the part of the others—not
the other world’s most important trading nations—not their
governments, not their executive branches, not their legislatures, not
businesses here or abroad, not civil society.
There is a second part to the present predicament. The United
States, professing itself tired of over a decade of complaining about
what it sees with some justification as overreach of the WTO dispute
settlement system, has stated that without some fundamental
corrections, without institutional reform, it will not approve the
seating of new Appellate Body Members. At the end of this year,
three of the seven seats on the Appellate Body will be empty, and
absent some resolution of the current impasse, a fourth seat becomes
empty ten months later. Why is this serious? At some point, a WTO
member who has prevailed in litigation before a WTO panel on the
illegitimacy of another member’s trade practices, and frustrated by
an appeal that cannot be heard, may well take matters into its own
hands, imposing retaliatory trade measures, followed by a response
in kind from the other member. Trade cases can be very large in
coverage and go very deep in terms of vested interests and vital
national policies. It is not far-fetched to envisage the beginning of a
trade war. It is harder to estimate whether it can be contained and
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how it will end.

WHERE ARE OTHER PLAYERS?
If that is where we find the United States and the WTO at present,
can and will other WTO members step forward to maintain order in
the system and work toward progress? There may in fact be some
evidence that there is change in Geneva. What cannot be ascertained
is whether in the vacuum created by the absence of the U.S. from its
accustomed role, the activities of others are greater or is it only that
they appear greater due to the lack of major activities by the former
lead actor. Examples of initiatives by others are the European Union
(EU) and Brazil joining together on a proposal on public
stockholding of commodities for food security, a proposal by the
Russian Federation on the same subject, and a proposal from China
on E-Commerce, to name a few. But my informal survey of member
governments makes it clear that it is the view of many members that
no WTO member or group has stepped forward to drive negotiations
forward the way that the United States did for the last 70 years.
The first candidate for exercising renewed multilateral leadership,
the European Union, might say that it is doing what it can despite the
fact that it has Brexit to contend with. This is not considered enough
by a number of other members that I have talked with. Perhaps it is
unrealistic for Brussels to consider a change in priorities, but the
impact on the world economy of a rudderless WTO is potentially far
greater than any of the possible BREXIT outcomes.
The EU would also perhaps say that it is intensifying as a possible
substitute for multilateral progress, its efforts with respect to a series
of bilateral arrangements, most notably so far, CETA (its Free Trade
Agreement with Canada), and its negotiations of an EU-Japan
arrangement that is said to be a potential template for an updating of
the WTO some point in the future. It is far from clear however, that
these endeavors are steppingstones on the way back to Geneva
designed to enhance the world’s multilateral trading system. There
is always a question with any regional arrangement whether it is
dividing the world rather than unifying it.
What about Japan? Japan played a leading role in crafting and
completing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), very much a
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departure from its defensive stance in prior WTO and GATT rounds.
That said, there is no evidence that Japan aspires to assuming a
similar major role in leading the world economy. For the near term,
Mr. Abe has a domestic economy that he is seeking to stimulate and
a constitution that he may seek to change, not to mention worrying
about North Korean missile overflights. There is no current evidence
that Japan expects to take on a leadership role. Japan is occupied
with finding alternative means to expand its trade relationships—by
design as with the EU, in the TPP minus one, and for the region,
RCEP—the Regional Comprehensive Partnership.
Of the largest trading entities, that leaves China. China’s top
leader, Xi Jinping, has been using all the right words about the kind
of world trading system China supports, starting with his positive
statement at Davos earlier this year. While China has tabled some
forward-leaning proposals, for example for E-Commerce, China
appears hesitant to take up the mantle cast aside by the United States.
Perhaps the world’s largest beneficiary of the global trading system
will at some point pick up more of the burden of leading it.
Well, that leaves all the rest. They fall into three camps: friends of
the system, those who appear nonaligned, and those who have a
more limited agenda. Amongst those countries already declared as
supporters of the system, one has yet to find a sense that these
smaller countries can fill much of the void left by the United States.
To be sure, if Rome was not built in a day, neither was it replaced in
a day as the central force governing world trade. While patience
may be called for, my judgment is that these friends can accomplish
more individually and collectively than perhaps they believe.
Among these friends is experience and creativity. They are
dependent on a world order that is now at risk. They may well come
to have a vision of a need to play a larger role in order to maintain
the integrity of the international trading system. Were they more
active, their activities might even stimulate additional leadership
from the EU, Japan and China.
What happens absent a coalescing of a broader group of activist
positive countries? It is not by any means a guaranteed return to the
dark ages, in trade this would be a sliding back toward the
protectionism of the 1930s. I do not believe that will happen. The
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world is not in the midst of an economic depression. What will more
likely occur is a narrowing of the prospects for possible progress,
when progress is needed. That has negative consequences for world
growth, but it is not a sudden catastrophe. The world trading system
is more likely to experience erosion perhaps not avulsion (when a
large cliff face falls into the sea).
My message is one of concern, not alarm. There is an enormous
amount of potential for forward progress in the multilateral trading
system right now. There should be some degree of momentum
derived from the successful conclusion of the Trade Facilitation
Agreement, the decision to abolish agricultural export subsidies
taken at the last Ministerial Conference, and the elimination of tariffs
on most of the world’s IT trade. There is potential for reducing the
impact on trade of domestic regulation in the form of licensing
procedures; qualification requirements and technical standards: there
is the possibility of a broad Trade Facilitation Agreement for
Services; for an agreement on investment facilitation; for focusing on
the issues presented by digital commerce; and for advancing the
participation of small and medium enterprises in world trade. There
is also a real opportunity to place limits on the subsidies that are
supporting overfishing in the world’s oceans. Throughout all these
issues, the interests of developing and industrialized countries are
more interwoven than ever before. They have a joint stake in
making the trading system work better even if their mutual interest is
not recognized by all.
What is required is a collective sense that more is possible,
combined with dedication to achieving it. The United States does
not appear to intend to stand in the way of progress broadly
supported by others. While the U.S. at present will apparently not
create the momentum for going forward, but it could join it. For this
to occur, there would need to be greater effort on the part of other
countries to move forward.
For this to succeed, there must be vigorous sustained support from
the private sector and from leaders in the world’s legislators. The
intellectual basis needs to be supplied by academia, think tanks and
nongovernmental organizations, among others. This must become an
accustomed role for each actor in the trade policy formulation
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process. This condition does not exist today. Acting as if nothing
has changed is a luxury that can no longer be afforded. The stakes
are too high, and the risks too great.
The system may be more fragile than is generally known, if as
noted above, the WTO dispute settlement system ceases to function
effectively. The WTO system of contractual obligations that
currently underwrites almost all of world trade could begin to at
some point to unravel. This contingency is not so remote that it is
impossible. The failsafe mechanism of the WTO rules might not
hold. Again, this is not a time for alarm, but for positive action.
There is a need to think of the future of the world trading system
and take a few sensible steps forward.

FIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD
What ought to be done? I have five suggestions, and I am sure that
others who support a vibrant international trading system will see
other possibilities

POLICY PLANNING
My happy assumption is that there is a trade policy planning staff
within each government, although I confess that this is not something
we had for trade in the U.S. government during the period when I
served. If no office or inter-ministerial committee exists, it should be
created and tasked with considering what the country’s trade policy
should be in the new circumstances. The prior assumptions are no
longer operable—that there would always be progress within a
multilateral negotiating forum and that the existing dispute
settlement system can be maintained without change.
Each
government should consider what steps it can take to ensure that the
multilateral trading system functions effectively.
Each should determine where its interests lie and how to go about
fostering them, or it can let nature take its course. Nature,
unfortunately, is not always kind nor is it predictable.

OUTREACH
Once objectives are set, it is axiomatic that no single country is
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going to dictate the external environment in which its trade will take
place, even if it resorts to barter, which is neither likely nor desirable.
This requires working in cooperation with others. In fact, some of
the policy planning will no doubt be an iterative process resulting
from contacts with the governments of other trading nations, and can
be the product of a joint policy planning process.

COALITIONS OF THE WILLING WITHIN THE WTO ON MULTILATERAL
APPROACHES

Once an agenda is agreed, the next step is to put it into effect.
Differing constellations of WTO members will coalesce around
issues for reform and progress at the WTO. Ministers must be
engaged in capitals while in direct contact with their representatives
in Geneva, and meeting in special sessions to drive progress.

PLURILATERALS
Fully multilateral agreement in their purest form no longer are
created. Agreements exist, a number within the WTO, in varying
hues reflecting differing levels of obligations. This is the case in the
Trade Facilitation Agreement, the Information Technology
Agreement, and for that matter, most of the agreements in the WTO.
The Government Procurement Agreement is the starkest example of
this phenomenon. Differing levels of obligation, as they remain
proportion to levels of benefit and capacity provide flexibility in
reaching broader accords.

REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (RTAS)
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have their place, and are
irresistible as forward progress in the WTO is not always possible,
but also because regional integration can be a net positive for the
world trading system. RTAs should always be negotiated with a
view to having as positive an impact on the multilateral trading
system as is practicable. At their best, they should be templates for
eventual WTO agreements. This was a reasonable purpose to ascribe
to both TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP).
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CONCLUSION
KEY RECENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND NEEDS GOING FORWARD
Bringing Agriculture and Services under the multilateral
framework, regulating domestic subsidies. The Uruguay Round
outcomes were just a start and contained a built-in agenda to further
develop the rules and open markets. Aside from the deal in Nairobi
on export subsidy elimination (which is a major step forward but by
the way has yet—two years down the track—to be implemented in
schedules of some major players), there has been no progress on
these issues. Further disciplines on agriculture and industrial
domestic subsidies and further opening of agriculture and services
markets are way overdue.
Binding dispute settlement. It is a major step forward for all
members to have the possibility (even if it is more theoretical for
some) to be able to enforce the contract. Of course, nothing is
perfect and there are still ways in which some can look to game the
system—e.g. through compliance process—but in aggregate it is
much better to have a system that keeps most honest than the
alternative.
What more do we need. The key overall point is that the world
(and the way in which business is done) has changed over the past 20
years. In addition to getting the unfinished business from the 20th
(and 19th) century sorted, we need to be able to address issues of
relevance to today’s world—particularly in the digital space.
And importantly, there is also, as yet, so real substitute for positive
U.S. engagement in looking to further open markets and strengthen
the system. I do not believe that this is the end of the story. I think
that the U.S. will at some point be back. Theory as to what is the
best trade policy can only take national action so far. At some point
reality intrudes.
One prominent trade minister, a strong critic of the WTO in a
number of respects, reportedly said recently, “If the WTO did not
exist, it would have to be invented.” That is a good thing to
remember and take to heart. Care must be taken that the world
trading system supported by the WTO is not eroded through illadvised trade-limiting national measures or simple inattention on the
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part of governments and major private sector stakeholders and civil
society. What we have is in some respects imperfect but re-creating
even this system might prove to be an impossible task.
We need to cherish the legacy we have received in the form of the
WTO, and we need to maintain it and improve it.

